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COULD THE INTERDICTUM UNDE VI BE BROUGHT BY A TENANT? 
D. 43,16,18pr. and Dorotheus, a Subsecivum Groninganum 
 
One of the eternal questions of Roman law, which can be debated to the delight of 
generation after generation of lawyers, concerns the question whether detentors were able 
to bring the interdict unde vi or de vi armata. The first one to suggest the possibility a 
detentor could bring the interdict de vi armata was Cicero. In his plea on behalf of 
Caecina, who was a detentor, he compared the wording of the interdict unde vi with the 
wording of the interdict de vi armata and concluded possession was not a requirement to 
bring the interdict de vi armata, because it’s wording did not contain the clause which 
required possession as did the interdict unde vi. The interdict de vi armata was brand-new 
when Cicero tried to give it this interpretation. Cicero pleaded on behalf of Caecina 
probably in 69 BC, whereas the interdict de vi armata probably was introduced in 71 BC.1 
Of course, Cicero needed this interpretation to secure a victory for Caecina, so the 
question remained whether his partisan interpretation was right.2 But still nowadays one 
finds the suggestion detentors, or at least tenants, could bring the interdict de vi armata 
and even unde vi in Romanistic legal literature.3 
Kaser, for instance, in his Handbuch, mentions the possibility and refers to Mayer-
Maly for further details.4 Mayer-Maly discusses two Digest-texts from title 43,16, dealing 
with the interdicts unde vi and de vi armata. These texts are fragment 12 and fragment 18. 
The first one is by Marcellus and the second one by Papinian. They treat of the same case. 
In this article I will deal with the text written by Papinian. It is a bit more extensive and 
the Byzantine text dealing with it is more interesting. 
 
 
                                                          
1  Cf. e.g. B.W. Frier, The rise of the Roman jurists, Princeton 1985, 45ff. and 52ff.; O.E. Tellegen-
Couperus, ‘C. Aquilius Gallus dans le discours Pro Caecina de Cicéron’, TRG 59 (1991), 37ff., 43 n. 
20; G. Falcone, Ricerche sull’origine dell’interdetto Uti possidetis, Palermo 1996, 21 n. 41. 
2  On ‘Ciceros Interesse für juristische Studien’, cf. H.L.W. Nelson, in: M. Tullius Cicero, De Oratore 
Libri III. Kommentar von A.D. Leeman, H. Pinkster, H.L.W. Nelson, 2. Bd., Heidelberg 1985, 22ff. 
3  Otherwise already e.g. W. Stroh, Taxis und Taktik. Die advokatische Dispositionskunst in Ciceros 
Gerichtsreden, Stuttgart 1975, 82f., with references. 
4  M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, I, München 1971, 390 n. 40; Th. Mayer-Maly, Locatio 







D. 43,16,18pr. reads like this: 
 
(PAPINIANUS libro vicensimo sexto quaestionum.) 
Cum fundum qui locaverat vendidisset, iussit emptorem in vacuam possessionem ire, quem 
colonus intrare prohibuit: postea emptor vi colonum expulit: de interdictis unde vi 
quaesitum est. placebat colonum interdicto venditori teneri, quia nihil interesset, ipsum an 
alium ex voluntate eius missum intrare prohibuerit: neque enim ante omissam possessionem 
videri, quam si tradita fuisset emptori, quia nemo eo animo esset, ut possessionem omitteret 
propter emptorem, quam emptor adeptus non fuisset. emptorem quoque, qui postea vim 
adhibuit, et ipsum interdicto colono teneri: non enim ab ipso, sed a venditore per vim 
fundum esse possessum, cui possessio esset ablata. quaesitum est, an emptori succurri 
debeat, si voluntate venditoris colonum postea vi expulisset. dixi non esse iuvandum, qui 
mandatum illicitum susceperit. 
It is translated by Watson et al. like this: 
 
(PAPINIAN, Questions, book 26:) 
The landlord of a farm sold it and directed the buyer to take up the vacant possession. His 
tenant prevented the buyer from entering. Afterward the buyer forcibly expelled the tenant. 
The question was about interdicts "where by force". It was held that the tenant was liable to 
the seller under the interdict, because it made no difference whether he prevented the seller 
himself or someone else sent by his wish from entering. For possession was not held to have 
been lost before it was delivered to the buyer, since no one is minded to lose on account of a 
buyer a possession which the buyer has not taken over. The buyer who subsequently applied 
force is also liable himself under the interdict to the tenant; for it was possessed not by him 
but by the seller, who had been deprived of possession. The question was, whether one 
should come to the buyer's aid, if it was by the wish of the seller that he afterward forcibly 
expelled the tenant. I said that one should not come to the aid of anyone who had carried out 
an illegal mandate. 
The case is a rather straight-forward one.5 The legal questions are less so. Someone has 
rented out his farm and then sells his farm to someone else. The seller instructs his buyer 
 
 
                                                          
5  The most recent discussions of the text, if one can call them that, I could find are O. Behrends, 
‘Selbstbehauptung und Vergeltung und das Gewaltverbot im geordneten bürgerlichen Zustand nach 
klassischem römischen Recht’, SZ 119 (2002), 74 n. 64 (I am not sure what he thinks) and G. 
Deppenkemper, SZ 118 (2001), 627, discussing H. Wieling’s Referat über ‘Besitzschutz und 
Rechtsschutz des Mieters und Pächters vom römischen Recht bis zum deutschen Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch’, at the symposium of Catanzaro and Messina called ‘ Diritto Romano e terzo millennio – 
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to take possession of the farm, but the tenant refuses to admit the buyer. The buyer then 
expels the tenant by force. The legal question is: who gets to bring the interdict unde vi? 
The answer given here by Papinian is, first of all the seller is able to bring the interdict 
against the tenant. He gives as a reason for this conclusion it makes no difference whether 
the tenant refuses to admit the buyer, or whether the tenant refuses to admit the seller. 
Secondly, the tenant is able to bring the interdict against the buyer, who expelled him. It is 
this second conclusion, especially, which raises eyebrows by many. 
Because the interdict unde vi is given here to the tenant, Mayer-Maly concludes 
‘Damit wird ein materielles Recht des Pächters auf uti frui während der vollen Pachtzeit 
possessorisch geschützt’ and ‘so wurde durch ein Interdiktenverfahren die Regel “Kauf 
bricht Miete” von den Byzantinern entwertet’.6 Of course, the Byzantines did it once 
again. Mayer-Maly wrote those words in 1956. Whether he would have written them 
nowadays, had he still been alive, is a matter of speculation. The tendency to rant against 
the Byzantines was alive and kicking back then. It led to suspicions of interpolation in 
almost any text. Some passages in this fragment were also bracketed by Mayer-Maly in 
his book on locatio-conductio. I will pass by these suggestions for the moment and try and 
see whether it is possible to explain the text without them. 
The first question Papinian answers is whether the seller is able to bring the interdict 
against the tenant. He says it is possible. It is possible, because it makes no difference 
whether the buyer is prevented from entering the farm or the seller himself is prevented 
from doing so. The seller remains in possession, he goes on to say, as long as the buyer 
has not gotten possession. What does this mean? Papinian appears to have meant it was 
the seller’s possession which was taken away by the refusal of the tenant to let the buyer 
enter upon the premises. The buyer would have become possessor when he had been able 
to enter the farm with the consent of the seller. The buyer, however, had been prevented 
from doing so by the tenant. The buyer could not bring the interdict. The seller could. 
Why? Because he was the one in possession at the moment the tenant refused to admit the 
buyer. Did this lead to loss of possession by the seller? Papinian appears to have thought 
so, because of his reasoning, equating the refusal of the tenant to let the buyer enter with 
the refusal of the tenant to let the seller, the tenant’s landlord, enter. That leaves the 
question whether the refusal of a tenant to let his landlord enter the premises he rents 
amounts to the taking of possession by the tenant? Obviously, Papinian thought so. 
 
 
                                                          
Radici e prospettive dell’esperienza giuridica contemporanea’, where Wieling appears to have 
concluded our text gave the tenant the interdict unde vi. The discussion is an old one; cf. e.g. F.C. von 
Savigny, Das Recht des Besitzes, Wien 18657 (repr. Aalen 1990), 424ff. 
6  Mayer-Maly, Locatio conductio (note 4 above), 55. Cf. in a comparable sense G. Wesenberg, 











(MARCELLUS libro nono decimo digestorum) 
Colonus eum, cui locator fundum vendiderat, cum is in possessionem missus esset, non 
admisit: deinde colonus vi ab alio deiectus est: quaerebatur, quis haberet interdictum unde 
vi. Dixi nihil interesse, colonus dominum ingredi volentem prohibuisset an emptorem, cui 
iussisset dominus tradi possessionem, non admisit. Igitur interdictum unde vi colono 
competiturum ipsumque simili interdicto locatori obstrictum fore, quem deiecisse tunc 
videretur, cum emptori possessionem non tradidit, nisi forte propter iustam et probabilem 
causam id fecisset. 
The translation by Watson et al. gives the following: 
A tenant did not admit someone to whom the landlord had sold the farm, when sent to take 
possession. Afterward the tenant was forcibly ejected by someone else. The question was: 
Who could avail himself of the interdict ‘where by force’? I said it makes no difference 
whether the tenant had prevented the owner when he wished to enter, or the buyer to whom 
the owner had ordered the possession to be delivered. Therefore, an interdict ‘where by 
force’ would lie in favor of the tenant, and the tenant would be liable under a similar 
interdict to the landlord, whom he would be held to have ejected at the time when he did not 
deliver possession to the buyer, unless it should be that he did this for a good and justifiable 
reason. 
Perhaps the situation with regard to the buyer is even more clear in this fragment. There 
Marcellus states a case where the seller instructs the tenant to deliver possession to the 
buyer. The tenant then does not let the buyer enter into possession. In Papinian’s case it is 
not clear whether the tenant knew of the sale or had been instructed to let the buyer enter 
into possession. But Marcellus also equates the prohibition to let the buyer enter into 
possession with the prohibition to let the seller, or owner as he is called there, enter the 
premises. 
That still leaves us with the question whether it is really the same thing to prevent a 
buyer from entering into possession of the farm he bought, or to prevent an owner from 
entering the farm he rented out? Is the owner allowed to enter the farm he rented out when 
he wants to? Does the refusal to let him enter amount to loss of possession for the owner 
under all circumstances? At least Marcellus seems to think there may be circumstances 
where the tenant is allowed to refuse his landlord to enter the farm, for he makes an 
exception in case the tenant has a good and justifiable reason to refuse entry to the buyer 
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and, so we may conclude, to the owner as well. So perhaps we should suppose, in 
Papinian’s text as well, the tenant was obliged to let the owner enter the premises and by 
refusing to do so acted in a way opposed to the way a tenant should act. By doing so the 
tenant made himself from a detentor into a possessor and took away the possession of the 
owner. He did so by acting publicly. So he did not change the cause of his possession all 
by himself, in contravention of the maxim nemo causam possessionis sibi ipse mutare 
potest.7 
But does this behavior amount to vis? There are two possible answers to this 
question. Either Papinian supposes the refusal to let the buyer enter to have been 
accompanied by such force, or the refusal itself is supposed to be force. There is a lot to be 
said for either supposition, but the second one is the one more appealing. Why? Because 
in the first explanation the text has to be read according to an unspecified supposition: 
there was force, but is not mentioned in the text. In the second explanation the facts 
mentioned in the text themselves, the prohibition to let the buyer enter, constitute force. At 
least Cujas seems to think so.8 One could find help of a lesser kind. 
So the explanation for the interdict of the owner or seller against the tenant is 
explained by the taking of possession by the tenant from the owner. That also explains 
why the tenant is able to bring the interdict against the buyer, when the buyer evicts the 
tenant by force. It is not the tenant as detentor who is evicted. It is the tenant who has 
become possessor who is evicted by the buyer. So the buyer takes possession by force 
from the tenant. The tenant has his interdict, not as a tenant, but as a possessor. 
This is the second question answered in Papinian’s text. The text appears to be not 
entirely flawless in the Codex Florentinus. In the sentence explaining why the tenant can 
bring the interdict against the buyer it says cui instead of cuius. The sentence reads non 
enim ab ipso, sed a venditore per vim fundum esse possessum, cui possessio esset ablata, 
which in translation reads: ‘for it was possessed not by him but by the seller, who had 
been deprived of possession’. This appears to translate cui and not cuius, which would 
lead to the translation ‘whose possession had been taken away’. Mommsen suggested to 
read cuius and explained this reading palaeographically by supposing the original could 
have read cui with a stroke indicating it was an abbreviation of cuius. I am not quite sure 
whether abbreviations of this kind were allowed to be used in the originals of Justinian’s 
 
 
                                                          
7  J. Cujas already explained all of this: Ad l. cum fundum 18, de vi et vi armata, In Libro XXVI 
Quaestionum Papiniani, in: Opera Postuma t. I, Paris 1658, col. 671ff. 







law codes. Perhaps cui could be seen as a lectio difficilior and should be preferred on that 
account. Anyhow, I do not see why cui should be opposed.9 
The fact that the tenant is able to bring the interdict against the buyer, according to 
Papinian, is also a clue for the fact that the refusal to let the buyer enter the land he bought 
is not depriving the buyer of his possession, but deprives the seller, the landlord of the 
tenant, of possession. Would the buyer have been deprived of possession by the tenant and 
subsequently have taken possession of the tenant by force, the tenant would have gotten 
into possession by force as against the buyer, which would have meant the tenant could 
not successfully have brought the interdict against the buyer. The exceptio quod vi aut 
clam aut precario could have been taken against him by the buyer, as the preceding 
fragment, D. 43,16,17, explains.10 
Where do the Byzantines come into all this? There is a scholion to be found in the 
Basilica which translates Papinian’s text in a quite explicit and therefor enlightening way. 
As it is a translation of text taken from that part of Justinian’s Digest which was not on the 
curriculum of the law schools of Justinian’s days, it has to be the antecessor Dorotheus, 
law professor Dorotheus, who translated this text.11 The text reads like this: 
 
BS 3514/18-32 (sch. Pe 8* ad B. 60,17,24 = D. 43,16,18) 
 Ὃν ἐμίσθωσέ τις ἀγρόν, τοῦτον ἐπώλησε καὶ ἐκέλευσε τῆς νομῆς αὐτοῦ ἐπιβῆναι τὸν 
ἀγοραστήν. Ὁ δὲ κολωνὸς ἐκώλυσεν αὐτὸν ἐπιβῆναι καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἀγοραστὴς ἐβιάσατο 
τὸν κολωνόν. Καὶ ζητεῖται περὶ τοῦ οὐνδεβὶ ἰντερδίκτου. Καὶ ἤρεσε τὸν μὲν κολωνὸν τῷ 
πράτῃ κατέχεσθαι. Οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορά, πότερον αὐτὸν ἀπήλασε τῆς νομῆς ἢ τὸν κατὰ 
βουλὴν αὐτοῦ πεμφθέντα ἀγοραστὴν οὐ συνεχώρησεν ἐπιβῆναι τῆς νομῆς. Οὐδὲ γὰρ 
ἐκπίπτειν δοκεῖ τῆς νομῆς ὁ πωλήσας τὸν ἀγρόν, εἰ καὶ ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν παραδοθῆναι τῷ 
ἀγοραστῇ, πρὶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν παραδοθῇ τῷ ἀγοραστῇ. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ τοιαύτην ἔχει 
προαίρεσιν, ὥστε ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς νομῆς διὰ τὸν ἀγοραστήν, ἧς ὁ ἀγοραστὴς οὐκ ἐπελάβετο. 
Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ ἀγοραστὴς ὁ μετὰ ταῦτα βιασάμενος τὸν κολωνὸν κατέχεται αὐτῷ τῷ 
ἰντερδίκτῳ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀγοραστήν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν πράτην ἐδόκει ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς 
νομῆς τοῦ ἀγροῦ ὁ κολωνός. Εἰ δὲ κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ πράτου ὁ ἀγοραστὴς τὸν κολωνὸν 
ἐβιάσατο, ζητεῖται μέν, εἰ ὀφείλει βοηθεῖσθαι ὁ ἀγοραστὴς ὡς γνώμῃ τοῦ πράτου 




                                                          
9  The Dutch translation of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, edited by Spruit, Feenstra and Bongenaar, vol. 6, 
(J.E. Spruit/R. Feenstra/F.B.J. Wubbe, [red.], Corpus iuris civilis. Tekst en Vertaling. VI: Digesta 
XLIII – L, Zutphen/’s-Gravenhage 2001) prefers Mommsen’s emendation. 
10  Cf. again Cujas, Ad l. cum fundum 18, de vi et vi armata (note 7 above), col. 671ff. 
11  Cf. F. Brandsma, Dorotheus and his Digest Translation, Groningen 1996, 43ff. 
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In translation this would mean the following: 
Someone who had rented out farmland, sold it, and ordered the buyer to enter upon the 
possession of it. The tenant, however, prevented him from entering, and later on the buyer 
ejected the tenant by force. The question about the interdictum unde vi was raised. And the 
answer was that, on the one hand, the tenant was liable to the seller. For it makes no 
difference, whether the tenant expelled the seller from the possession, or he did not suffer 
the buyer to enter upon the possession, the buyer being sent in accordance with the seller’s 
will. For it is held that the seller of the farmland does not lose the possession, even if he 
ordered it to be handed over to the buyer, before it was handed over to the buyer in reality. 
For no one is of that intention that because of the buyer he loses the possession, which the 
buyer did not get hold of. But also the buyer himself, who later on expelled the tenant, is 
liable to the tenant under the interdict. For it is held that the tenant is holding the possession 
of the farmland by force, not against the buyer, but against the seller. But if the buyer 
ejected the tenant by force in accordance with the will of the seller, the question arises 
whether the buyer has to be helped, because he expelled the tenant in accordance with the 
will of the seller. The answer was, however, that he should not be helped, because he 
rendered service to an illegal mandate of the seller. 
The key sentence is the following. ‘For it is held that the tenant is holding the possession 
of the farmland by force, not against the buyer, but against the seller’. That is more clear 
than the original by Papinian: non enim ab ipso, sed a venditore per vim fundum esse 
possessum, cui possessio esset ablata; ‘for it was possessed not by him but by the seller, 
who had been deprived of possession’.12 
What does it mean some Byzantine law professor translated our text like this? Well, 
first of all we know how this text was explained in Justinian’s days. Next, we can deduce 
from the fact even a Byzantine lawyer thought it well advised to state the meaning of the 
text more clearly than the original did, that no alterations were made to the text Papinian 
left behind. For if these alterations were thought necessary, the wretched Byzantines could 
have made them. Dorotheus was one of the members of the committee who drafted the 
Digest on behalf of Justinian. He need not have bothered to make the clarifications he 
thought necessary only in his translation. The fact that clarifications were thought 
necessary by one of the committee-members, points to the inclination of the lawyers who 
made Justinian’s codes to stick to the texts of the classical lawyers as preserved as much 
 
 
                                                          
12  See for a comparable exposition of the text already e.g. J.A.C. Thomas, ‘The sitting tenant’, TRG 41 







as possible. So the conclusion must be that the possibility for a tenant to bring the interdict 
unde vi cannot be based on the texts discussed here.13 
Papinian’s text, it must be admitted, presents a lawyers’ paradise. The buyer has to 
give the land back to the tenant, who has to give the land back to the seller, who has to 
hand over the land to the buyer. The tenant can bring the interdict unde vi against the 
buyer. The seller can bring the same interdict against the buyer. The buyer can, of course, 
bring the actio empti against the seller. It is all about bringing the right action by the right 
person. Whether we have an actual case here at hand, is not quite sure. That it is a case 
which delights lawyers throughout the ages is an indisputable fact. Where would we be 
without the possibility to discuss cases like this? In a world where legal realism states that 
the answer to questions like this one is given by the person who gets to decide them. Do 
we want to live in a world like that? I don’t think so. 
Of course, the seller and owner of the farm himself could have taken back the 
possession of it from the tenant successfully, because the tenant’s interdict could be 
opposed by him on the basis of the exceptio quod vi aut clam aut precario. Could he not 
have delegated the task of expelling the tenant to the buyer? No, the text says quite 
unequivocally. He cannot have his dirty work be done by someone else. 
 







                                                          
13  O. Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum. Ein Versuch zu seiner Wiederherstellung, Leipzig 19273 (repr. 
Amsterdam & Aalen 2010), 463f., already clearly denied this possibility, even under the interdict de 
vi armata. 
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